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This paper is in response to a growing concern about the adequacy
of present measures and methodologies in depicting air-to-ground delivery
system accuracy. An accuracy measure, measurement methodology and
performance guarantee based on cost-effectiveness techniques are
developed. The measure is based on the frequency of mission success.
The methodology is based on Bayesian techniques using a multinomial
distribution to represent the radial miss distance pattern. A technique
for using an estimate of CEP to determine the prior parameters is
developed. Actual and simulated impact data are used to compare the
proposed methodology to historically accepted and other recently proposed
techniques. The methods of cost-effectiveness are applied to guaranteeing
an air-to-ground system in an effort toward making costs more controllable,
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The intent of this thesis is threefold; to propose a measure
of
effectiveness; to propose a method to determine the specific
effective-
ness; and to propose the concept of a cost-effectiveness
guarantee.
All three are proposed with respect to an air-to-ground (A/G)
weapons
delivery system in a dive maneuver. However, the techniques
proposed,
with the necessary modifications, appear to have wider applications.
Some of the development is incomplete and requires further
investigation.
B. NEED FOR ACCURACY MEASUREMENT
Prior to developing a method for measuring the accuracy of an
A/G
delivery system, it is important to understand the need for
accuracy
measurement. Several needs are discussed.
1 . Specification Compliance
In the Test and Evaluation (T&E) community a determination of
specification compliance is usually the prime motive for measuring
accuracy. The accuracy measure and occasionally methodology are
speci-
fied in the applicable contract guarantees. Confusion can be
introduced
by the use of different measurement units and methodologies in
different
specifications.
A typical, though fictitious, example of an accuracy specification
is:
"Exhibit a 15 mil circular error probable(XEP) , corrected for
aiming error, computed in the plane normal to the line of sight
from the release point when delivering Mk-76 practice bombs
at a release airspeed between 400 and 450 KIAS, a dive angle
„ between 40 and 50 degrees and a release slant range to target
less than 10,000 feet."
Testing to this specification would probably be expensive.

Also inherent in the specification example is the singular
usage
of the measure of accuracy. This measure in itself
has little value
outside of the specification context. Therefore, it
appears that a
significant amount of money and time would be expended with
negligible
information gain beyond specification compliance.
2. Sortie Predictions
In the employment of an A/G system there is a need for a
differ-
ent measure of accuracy. Strike planners and weaponeers
need to estimate
the probability of a weapon impacting within a given
distance of a target.
(The methodology used for this purpose is described later.)
This is an
important need as it is required throughout the lifetime of
the system.
3, System Comparisons
Often a need arises to compare a system with some other
system
or systems. One of the measures of effectiveness that
should be used for
comparison is accuracy. Thus, a need arises for a measure of
accuracy,
common to the various systems being compared. An identical
need exists
if a cost-effectiveness analysis is to be conducted.
Three general requirements for measurement of accuracy have
been
discussed. As presented, each of these requirements uses
a different
measure and the measures need not be compatibly defined.
In theory, it
could occur that several separate determinations of accuracy
would be
required for a single system. In practice, this is not
usual, however,
a common technique would be beneficial so that all
requirements could
use the same measure.
C. HISTORICAL MEASUREMENT METHODS
Historically the measurement of accuracy of nearly all
types of




parameters that define these distributions. Several terms that are
commonly used in weapons accuracy analysis are shown in Figure 1.
1 . Distributions
The normal family of probability distributions has long been
accepted as the proper family for the distribution of weapon impacts.
Recently this concept has come under closer scrutiny. It has been
suggested that a normal distribution may not always accurately depict
a parent distribution of impacts and other families such as the Cauchy
have been proposed [1J.
a. Normal and Variations
Many different variations of the normal distribution have
been used or proposed but only the two most common are discussed.
(1) Bivariate Normal . The bivariate normal is the more
flexible of the two variations discussed, permitting the errors in range
and deflection to be correlated. Letting x denote range and y denote
deflection, the density function is:
(1) f(x,y) = 3 rexp{
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Often the range and deflection errors are assumed to be nearly uncorre-
cted so that p is approximately zero. A rotation of the coordinate
system can also be used to eliminate the correlation but the resulting
variables do not represent true range and deflection errors. The
uncorrelated density reduces to:
(2) f U,y) = 5^_ exp < 4 E (^) 2 (^) 2 ] )

Range Error (x) Aircraft Flight
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mpact
Radial Error (r )
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Figure I.
Depiction in the Ground Plane of terms





y - mean of the range error distribution
u - mean of the deflection error distribution
y
a - variance of the range error distribution
a
2
- variance of the deflection error distribution
p - correlation between the range and deflection errors
Standard statistical techniques can be used to estimate these parameters
from observed data.
(2) Circular Normal . The more commonly used normal distri-
bution is the circular normal in which it is assumed that the range and
deflection errors are independent (uncorrelated) , have mean zero and
have common variance. The circular normal cumulative function where r
is the radial miss distance is:
(3) F(r) = 1 - exp {- -^ } ; r >
2a
Procedures have been developed for use when a
x
f a
[2, p. 3 and 4]; i.e., the distribution is an elliptical normal.
An axis rotation can be used to eliminate the correlation between range
and deflection.
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The circular normal has computational simplicity over





An Air Force report [1] of an analysis of combat impacts
observed in Southeast Asia found that the normal family did not yield a
good distributional fit of the data. One of the distributions that was
shown to closely approximate the data was the Cauchy.
The functional forms of the Cauchy were proposed;
(4) Rectangular Cauchy F(x,y) = -y tan" *~ tan" -^
2
(5) Circular Cauchy F(r) = - tan"
1





The estimator for the parameter $ was proposed as:
3 = .455 • (radial miss distance of the median impact)
The functional forms of the Cauchy proposed have the
advantage of simplicity but lack mean values.
c. Direct Hits Plus Distribution
The Air Force study [1] pointed out that several impacts
were observed to be directly on target contrary to the predictions of
a continuous distribution function. This may be explained by considering
the method of measuring the miss distances (photographic), the physical
size of the target and some ego oriented, psychological attraction of
the target itself. The method proposed to account for the positive
mass at the target was to introduce a proportion of direct hits. The
distribution function then becomes:
(6) G(x,y) = 6 + (1-6) F(x,y) in the bivariate case, or
(7) G(r) = 5 + (1-6) F(r) in the circular case.
The parameter 6 could be estimated from prior experience or





Literally hundreds of different distributions such as the
Weibul, exponential or uniform or variations of distributions such as
a mixture of two circular normals or a localized normal have been
proposed. Two interesting facts emerge from these proposals. First,
as the predictive ability of the distributions increases, the complexity
of the functional form generally increases. This usually increases
manipulation difficulty. Secondly, nearly all of the distributions or
variations proposed are continuous.
2. Measures
There are several commonly accepted measures of accuracy which
are functionally related to the parameters defining a unique distribution
in an assumed family of impact distributions. These measures are
graphically portrayed in Figure 2.
a. CEP
The circular error probable is defined as the radius of a
circle centered at the target (or designated point) which contains
50 percent of the observed independent impacts, or, the radial distance
to the median impact [4, p. 1-1, 1-2]. The functional relationship of
CEP to the distribution parameters is found from the following integral:
CEP
(8) F(CEP) = / f(r) dr = .5








Depiction of Accuracy Measures in
the Ground Plane.
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CEP = o\jl ln(2)' = 1.1774a
b. REP/DEP
The range error probable and deflection error probable are
similar to CEP. The REP is the distance from the target (or some desig-
nated point) to the median impact in range [4, p. 1-2,1-3]. The functional
relationship of REP to the distributional parameters is:
REP
(9) F(REP) - F(-REP) = .5 = / f(x) dx where f(x) is the
-REP
marginal distribution of x from f(x,y)
DEP is defined similarly. For a bivariate normal distribution,
REP = .674a and DEP = .674a .
x y
It should be noted that if an axis rotation was used to
uncorrelate the range errors and deflection errors, the functional form
in equation (9) is no longer valid. This is a serious disadvantage of




The mean radial error is defined as the mean of the radial
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this integral is solved [5, p. 458] as
E[r] = —^a = 1.253a = MRE
Of the listed measures, the MRE is probably the least .
frequently used.
d. MP I
The mean point of impact is the point which has as its range
and deflection coordinates the arithmetic means of the range and
deflection coordinates of the individual impact points [4, p. 1-3].
The MPI is calculated from an observed sample of impacts rather than
a hypothetical distribution. In many analyses (such as T&E) [Refs. 18,
20,23, and 24], the MPI is used as the center of the observed impact
distribution instead of the target. The offset of the MPI from the target
is termed a system bias and the CEP, REP, DEP and MRE are calculated with
respect to the MPI. Obviously, this technique would not be useful in
weaponeering applications.
Analogous to the MPI are the mean point of impact in range
and deflection (MPIR, MPID) which are the arithmetic means of the impacts
in range and deflection,
e. Other
Three other definitions given in the Joint Munitions Effective-
ness Manual (JMEM) [4, p. 1-1,1-2] are of interest and are quoted.
(1) "Bombing Error . The combination of all errors which
cause weapons to miss the target. Included are ballistic, aiming, release
and aircraft system errors."
(2) "Ballistic Dispersion . The variation of the path of a




(3) "Delivery Accuracy . The measure of the ability of
pilots to put the weapon impact pattern center (usually MPI) on the
target or aimpoint. The unit of measure of the variation in placement
of the pattern center may be a, CEP, or REP and DEP. It is these measures
that are used in predicting the results of future weapon releases of the
same type. Delivery accuracy is based on the errors in aiming, release
and aircraft systems. It does not include ballistic errors."
3. Mils
In many applications the accuracy measures are expressed in mils
(mil li radians) perpendicular to the line of sight (LOS) at release or
some other appropriate point along the aircraft flight path. The geometry
involved in the computation of the mil is presented in Figure 3. A mil
is usually defined as the angle subtended by a secant line of one foot
length at a radius of 1000 feet [4, p. 4-2]. The deflection mil error (dm )




on <im = —t-^m s
Due to the geometry, the deflection error in the ground plane is identical
to the deflection error in the scoring plane, thus no correction is
required. The range mil error is computed by the following equations:
1000 r
(12) r = where r can be closely approximated

























Geometry of the Mil Definition
Depression of the Los from the
horizontal.
Slant range to the target in feet.
Range miss distance in the ground
plane in feet.





Theoretically, the use of mils transforms impact data taken
from various release slant ranges and dive angles to a common base.
Traditionally, separate accuracy measures are specified for each given
set of release conditions; i.e., slant range, flight path angle, airspeed
and maneuver. The use of mils permits some aggregation of accuracy data
over release conditions.
D. PROBLEM
From the material thus far presented it is concluded that a single,
general accuracy measure and methodology could be advantageous. Some of
the more important attributes of a good measure and methodology are:
a. suitability to each need for the measurement of accuracy.
b. exactness of the estimation methodology.
c. minimal amount of testing required to achieve the desired
estimation exactness.
d. freedom from distributional and other assumptions restricting
the applicability.
e. independence from delivery conditions.
f. mathematical tractability and computational simplicity
1) for data analysis.
2) for weaponeering.
3) for maintenance of capability records.
g. adaptibility to new systems.
Even the few attributes listed above indicate the difficulty of
deriving an "optimal" measure and measurement methodology. Additionally,
Exactness is defined as the minimum error throughout this thesis.
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the preferential ordering assigned the attributes by an individual will
significantly influence his judgement of the "goodness" of a particular
i
method.
By carefully defining the problem and attempting to give preference
to all phases of the problem, a methodology has been developed. This is
not proposed as the "optimal" method but it does have more of the attri-




Prior to developing a methodology for determining accuracy, a specific
measure of accuracy should be determined.
A. SYSTEM FUNCTION
The JMEM definition of delivery accuracy (quoted earlier) can be
paraphrased as the placement of an impact pattern center on a designated
point. The measure of accuracy being some description of the precision
of that placement. However, accuracy of an A/G delivery system may also
be thought of as the frequency with which a system performs its assigned
function or functions. This definition differs from the JMEM in that it
does not include assumptions about an impact pattern. (it is distribution
free) and it gives the accuracy measure in terms of the mission. An A/G
delivery system has the singular function or mission in a combat role of
target destruction.
Two important results can now be discerned. First, the singular
function of target destruction greatly simplifies the development that
follows. Second, a basis for the proposed definition of delivery accuracy
has been reached. This basis can be built upon to derive a measure and
methodology that are related directly to the system mission.
B. MEASURE OF EFFECTIVENESS
Based on a mission of target destruction, the accuracy measure
definition is the frequency with which target destruction is achieved.
An interpretation of the frequency could be the number of targets destroyed
per sortie. Note that this is the inverse of a common weaponeering
measure, the number of sorties required to destroy a target. The averaging
21

over sorties is not essential. It could have been taken over weapons
expended, attacks or other quantities. Sorties was chosen because it
is commonly used as a normalizing quantity in aviation terminology.
It may seem that the number of targets destroyed per sortie is more
a measure of effectiveness (MOE) than an accuracy measure. In many
contexts, the MOE may be a function of an accuracy measure. For brevity,
the term MOE will be used and should be interpreted as meaning both
accuracy measure and measure of effectiveness.
The MOE chosen (targets destroyed per sortie) closely resembles that
used by the Weapon System Effectiveness Industry Advisory Committee
(WSEIAC) [6, p. 24,25] which presents some recent analyses of related
problems.
C. WEAPONEERING EQUATION
The MOE chosen can be mathematically expressed by a probability
statement; the probability that the target is destroyed in a certain
number of sorties. This is symbolized in the familiar concept of the
probability of failure equals the product of the probabilities of failure
on each of several assumed independent trails as:
(14) a = 1 - (1 - p}
n
* where;
a is the probability that the target is destroyed.
p is the probability of target destruction in a single attack.
n is the number of sorties
l is the number of attacks per sortie.




( 15 > 1/n - ln(l-a)
Equation (15) will be called the "weaponeering equation".
For convenience in this thesis, the number of attacks per sortie U)
will be assumed to be unity. In many applications, such as against
heavily defended targets, a is unity by policy. However, no loss of
generality or mathematical inconsistencies are imposed due to taking l
to be unity.
Superficially, the probability of target destruction in a single
attack (p) may appear to be identical to the historical measure of
accuracy. A closer examination shows p to be more. Inherently, p
depends on the destructive radius of the weapon/target combination {rQ ).
However, the results of the WSEIAC analysis [7, p. 22-33] give a deeper
insight into p. The WSEIAC report concluded that p should be related to
the availability, dependability and capability of the system by the
following equation.
(16) p = A
T
DC where
A is the transpose of the vector of probabilities that the
system is in some state the start of the mission.
D is the matrix of probabilities that the system is in
some state at the required mission time conditioned on
the state of the system at the start of the mission.
C is the vector of capabilities conditioned on the system
state.
Appendix C gives an example of the use of the above equation to enhance
understanding of this important concept.
Now it can be seen that C, the capabilities, are what were commonly
referred to historically as the measure of accuracy. An important




As defined, the capability is related to r and conditioned on the
system state. No mention is made concerning the delivery conditions.
This is a radical departure from the historical method of tying the
accuracy to a specific set of delivery conditions. In theory and in
reality, the probability of placing a weapon within a given distance of
the target is dependent on the delivery conditions. However, the
experienced attack aviator who has flown in combat or attempted to
achieve a specified set of delivery conditions over an unfamiliar target
and terrain on the first attack will readily admit the difficulty
involved. The presence of enemy defenses affects all delivery parameters
and can cause large deviations from programmed dive angle, airspeed,
release altitude and run-in heading. Cloud conditions different from
those predicted may dictate last minute changes in dive angle, release
altitude and run-in heading. Winds not anticipated can cause dive angle
and run-in heading to change during the attack. In close formation attacks
each aircraft usually achieves a different set of delivery conditions.
In older, manual delivery systems, the sight setting used was based on
a precise set of delivery conditions. Thus, a great importance was
imposed on the achievement of these prescribed conditions. Now, sophis-
ticated systems continually compute the predicted weapon impact point
and automatically release the weapon when some designated point coincides
with the predicted impact point. The pilot using this system is free to
vary his delivery conditions "within reason" as he deems appropriate.
Dive angle and release altitude define the slant range to the
target which is an influential parameter in the accuracy.
24

It seems reasonable to insist that the capability measure also be
free of delivery conditions.
The "within reason" phrase cited above gives qualitative bounds on
the delivery conditions. These bounds should reflect the current
operational tactics, and can be expected to change with time. For
example, in the "Vietnam Era," the bounds might have been:
a. Dive angle 25 to 60 degrees
b. Release altitude 4000 to 7000 feet
c. Airspeed 400 to 600 KIAS
d. Run-in heading to 360 degrees
25

III. ACCURACY ESTIMATION METHODOLOGY
The proposed MOE requires the estimation of p = A DC. The estimation
of availability and dependability (A and D) has been well documented in
numerous reports including the WSEIAC [7]. A method of estimating
capability (C), as used to estimate p, is developed herein.
A. DERIVATION
The detailed derivation is presented in Appendix A. The derivation
of the estimator for C follows a Bayesian approach. The techniques of
the Bayesian approach are explained by DeGroot [8], Savage, Raiffa,
Schlaifer and many others. The derivation is summarized below to provide
continuity.
A squared error loss function was derived as:
a * 2
(17) L = 5- [ln(l-p)-ln(l-p)] where p is the estimator of p.
(ln(l-a)) 2
The Bayes estimator was found to be:
(18) D* = E[ln(l-p)] (the symbol " * " indicates a Bayes estimator)
Members of the multinomial family of distributions were chosen as
the sampling distributions because they can be used to approximate any
distributional shape. The probability mass function of the multinomial
is:
(19) f(xr ...,xk |N, PlJ ... >Pk )





A Bayes estimator is the one which minimizes the expected loss
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kwhere N = ex.
i=l
1




and x. is the number of impacts observed in the i interval.
The conjugate family for the multinomial is the Dirichlet. Its density
function is:
r(a-|+ ... + a
k
) a^-1 a^-1
















Using the conjugate family, the parameters of the posterior Dirichlet
distribution of the p. are a, + x,,..., a. + x. .
With an assumption and an approximation, the Bayes estimator for C was
found to be
m a - + x. k
(21) C* = i — where a = E fa. + x.) , and m is the
i=l a o ° i=l
1 1
smallest integer greater than or equal to
r /interval length of the multinomial
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It was found that the prior parameters could be assigned by assuming a
prior value for CEP and making some assumptions.
Appendices B, C and D delineate the proposed procedure using an
example problem.
B. ASSUMPTIONS
Several assumptions are made in the measure and measurement methodology
derivation. This section will present a complete listing of all the




Independent trials were assumed in the weaponeering equation
(section II. C). In testing, the independence can be achieved by using
only the first weapon dropped in a series or by randomization of the
delivery maneuvers and parameters so that no two consecutive deliveries
are the same. For prediction, the independence assumption is conservative
as it neglects the possibility of multipass improvement.
2. Accuracy Definition
The "frequency with which a system performs its assigned function(s)"
definition is one of many possible definitions. The rationale behind
the particular choice was the direct link to the mission as discussed in
section II. A.
3. Accuracy Measure
The "rate of target destruction per sortie" is, again, one of many
possible choices. The rationale was discussed in section II. B.
4. Single Attack per Sortie
The assumption that i - 1 was made for convenience and has no




5. Independence from Delivery Conditions
The specific assumptions and an extensive discussion of the
rationale was presented in section II. D.
6. Squared Error Loss Function
The rationale behind the choice of the quadratic loss function
was the generality and tractibility of that form. The implicit assumption
of the loss being equal for overestimates and underestimates is a simplifi-
cation. If separate treatment is preferred, the methodology is still
correct as shown in Ref. 17, p. 195-197.
7. Radial Miss Distance
The radial errors were analyzed vice separate treatment of the
range and deflection errors. The rationale being that any emphasis placed
on a particular heading, or more importantly, heading relative to some
target axis may lead to erroneous conclusions. Ideally, use of the proper
run-in heading can increase the accuracy but due to the reasons cited in
section II. E, this will often result in an overestimate of the true
accuracy.
The radial measure is expressed in the ground plane. The advan-
tages of using mils in the scoring plane are obvious, especially in view
of the varied release conditions. Unfortunately, targets are usually
found in the ground plane and most weapons detonate on impact with the
ground. The geometry of the problem will also show that weapons designed
to detonate at a fixed altitude yield to a miss distance measured in a
ground plane projected horizontally up to the burst height.
8. Perfect Reliability
The assumption that A D = 1 was made for simplicity. Assuming
otherwise complicates the mathematics but does not alter the concept.
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9. CEP as Assigned Prior
Assigning a CEP is one of several methods of assigning the ou *s
required in the prior distribution. The rationale for choosing CEP is
given in Appendix A but other schemes might suffice.
10. Uniform Distribution of pj
The justification for setting all the E[p..] equal, up to the CEP,
is based on the resulting mathematical simplicity. Other assignments
might be acceptable but might also add to the difficulty of analysis.
11. Each pj Distributed Symmetrically
Assuming each p. is distributed symmetrically about its expected
value is another simplifying step. Assignment of specific values to
V[p.] is possible for i=l,...,j but adds another subjective decision to
the analysis.
Deletion of assumptions 4 and 6 through 11 does not affect the
methodology. The mathematics become more cumbersome and the estimator,
D*, may differ, but the concept remains unchanged.
Assumptions 9 through 11 simplify the determination of the o^'s and
as will be shown in the numerical analysis [section IV), yield good
results. However, changing these assumptions does not alter the estimator.
C. APPLICABILITY
Both the accuracy measure and methodology have been derived. It is
worthwhile now to reflect back to the listed attributes (section I.D)
and comment on the compliance with them.
1 . Suitability to Needs
The three needs cited were specification compliance, weaponeering,
and system comparison. The suitability of the selected MOE to the latter
two needs is apparent. The weaponeering measure was used as the MOE and
an MOE is one of the essential elements of system comparison.
30

The sutiability to specification compliance is not obvious and
in view of present specifications is even dubious. In section V it will
be shown that specifications can be couched in terms of cost-effectiveness
with many attendant advantages. The suitability should become apparent
in that context.
2. Exactness
The methodology derivation results in a Bayes estimator of the
accuracy measure. The Bayes estimator derived is a sufficient statistic
[8, p. 159] which means that no more information relative to the estimate
can be garnered from the data [8, p. 155]. The use of Bayes procedures
also allows probability statements to be made about the parameter (p^
of interest.
The numerical analysis (section IV) shows that the proposed
methodology is the most exact of the several techniques compared.
3. Minimal Testing
The numerical analysis (section IV) shows that an average error
in n
1
of approximately three sorties per target destroyed can be achieved
with 100 data points. For r values in excess of 40 feet, the corresponding
error is less than two. The 100 impacts is less than that required to
achieve comparable exactness with the other techniques evaluated.
4. Distribution Free
The multinomial density permits the data to define its own distri-
butional shape as shown in Appendix A.
5. Independent of Delivery Parameters
The independence from delivery conditions was discussed in
section II. D.
Hhe reason for shifting to n vice 1/n is explained in section IV
31

s6. Tractibility and Simplicity
The use of a conjugate family simplifies the data analysis as
hown in Appendix B. The weaponeering can be accomplished
from one
table and one graph as shown in Appendix D. As the number of
data points
increases, the influence of the prior decreases. Thus, operational
units
which usually collect extensive data, need only maintain the
total number
of impacts in each of the appropriate intervals.
7. Adaptibility
The adaptability is highly dependent on the nature of the
adaption required. No quantitative assessment of the adaptability
can




Numerical analysis was used to compare the proposed method with
other historical techniques. The Center for Naval Analysis graciously
provided extensive A-7E weapons delivery data. There were 1244 impacts
delivered from system dive maneuvers with reasonable release conditions.
These data were used to make a comparison with real world data. Simu-
lation data was used to make comparisons based on various known
distributions with known parameters. A sensitivity analysis of the CEP
value used for the prior was also conducted.
The quantity used for comparison was the inverse of the accuracy
measure proposed. The magnitude of the actual minus predicted 1/n would
be inversely related to the magnitude of n ( l/nn|n-n| ) and would lose
meaning if n were not presented. In the interests of security, the
value of n will not be presented. So, A = |n-n| is the parameter
compared. (This term, A, is referred to as the comparator in the figures.)
A. A-7E DATA
The accuracy parameters derived from the A-7E data are not given, again,
in the interests of security.
The true distribution of impacts was assumed to be that defined by the
data. The large number of impacts (1244) lend credibility to this
assumption. The n used in computing A was derived from the percent of
observed impacts within the appropriate r value.
The techniques compared to the proposed methodology were based on
the commonly used circular normal distribution and on the recently proposed
Cauchy distribution (see section I.C.l.b). Both the regular distributions
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and the distribution plus a percentage of direct hits were used. The
percent of direct hits was that observed in the data. The parameters
necessary for the comparison distributions were derived from the observed
data using the estimators shown in Section I.C.I. a and I.C.I .b
.
A sample size of 100 randomly selected data points was chosen as
being representative of a small number of observations for most purposes,
yet, a readily achievable number in a test environment. Fifty runs of
100 impacts each were conducted sequentially so that a total of 5000
random data points were drawn from the 1244 impacts available. As a test
of the randomness of the samples, the mean radial error for each of the
50 runs were compared and no two were found equal when rounded to the
nearest integer value.
The comparisons were conducted for r values of 30 through 80 feet in
10 foot increments. The interval length (w) chosen for the multinomial
sampling distribution was 10 feet. The a (probability of target destruc-
tion) was chosen to be 0.9S. The CEP chosen for the Bayes prior was of a
nominal value and was over 15 feet different from the value observed in
the 1244 impacts.
Figure 5 presents a plot of a versus r for the different measurement
methodologies. Qualitatively, the circular normal yields the worst a
values and the Bayesian method the best. The Bayesian method completely
dominates for r values of 50 feet and greater. All the estimates approach
a common value at r = 70 feet. An interesting point is that the Cauchy
distribution appears to be a better estimator than the Cauchy plus direct
hits distribution.














x Cauchy S Direct
O Normal









1. Normal plus direct 3.3
2. Bayesian 3.4
3. Cauchy 3.6
4. Cauchy plus direct 4.8
5. Normal 7.9
The slight advantage of the normal plus direct distribution results from
the large difference at r = 30 feet. It can be concluded that the exact
knowledge of the percent of direct hits was of considerable aid to the
normal plus direct distribution. This is substantiated by the fact that
the A value for the normal plus direct is smaller at r = 20 feet than
at r =30 feet. Removing the r value of 30 feet results in both the
e e
Bayesian and Cauchy moving ahead of the normal plus direct.
Though not presented in figure 5, several other techniques for calcu-
lating the multinomial parameters (p.) were compared to the Bayesian.
The maximum likelihood estimator of p. = x. / N and several weighted
averages of three and five adjacent intervals (i.e.,




+ Vl + w i + w i + l + V2
yielded a values significantly greater than those resulting from the
Bayesian technique.
B. SIMULATION
In order to test the Bayesian technique across a wider set of possible
impact distributions, the desired distributions were simulated. The
programs used to generate the distributions were those presented in
Ref. 10 except for the Cauchy. The Cauchy was generated by solving
equation (5) for r while using a random number generator to assign values
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between and 1 to F(r). A CEP of 150 feet and three percent direct hits
were used in the generation of data points. The distributions simulated
were the regular and the regular plus direct hit forms of the exponential,
circular normal, circular Cauchy and uniform and a mixture of two
circular normal distributions. The mixture consisted of 30 percent with
CEP = 60 feet and 70 percent with CEP = 200 feet. The simulation
routines were verified by plotting and by comparing the generated
statistics to the input values.
The same techniques were used for comparison as with the A-7E data
(section IV. A). The percent of direct hits was assigned the known value
of three percent. The r value chosen was 50 feet and the Bayes prior
was CEP = 150 feet. One hundred runs of 100 samples each were conducted.
Figure 6 presents the A value for each of the techniques and each of
the simulated distributions. The Bayesian technique provided the best
estimator for the exponential, uniform and mixed normal distributions.
Surprisingly, the Bayesian technique also provided the best estimator for
the Cauchy plus direct hit distribution but by a yery small margin.
Table I presents the same results in terms of the ranking of each
technique for each distribution. The Bayesian was best overall.
To ensure that the test was not biased by the use of the exponential
and uniform distributions, these were removed. Table I also presents
these results and the Bayesian technique is still seen to be the best.
Interestingly, both the Cauchy and normal plus direct surpass the Cauchy
plus direct when the exponential and uniform distributions are removed.
It can be concluded that the Bayesian technique provides the most
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Figure 6.
Comparator Values for Simulation Data.
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The A-7E data was used to test the sensitivity of the CEP value used
for the Bayesian prior. As before, 50 runs of 100 samples each were
conducted. The r value used was 50 feet. CEP values from 120 to 180
e
feet in increments of 10 feet were tested.
Figure 7 presents the A values versus the CEP values. The A values
range from 2.1 to 3.1. The minimum A value does not occur at the true
CEP. The A values at r = 50 feet, for three of the other techniques
are presented for comparison.
It can be concluded that the Bayesian technique is relatively insensi-
tive to the prior CEP value chosen when 100 data points are available, and
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The purpose of this section is to attempt to employ the methodology
of cost-effectiveness analysis in specifying and evaluating a contract
guarantee for an A/G delivery system. Cost-effectiveness analysis has
been defined as "a method for studying how to make the best of several
choices. Cost-effectiveness is always used in relation to the effective-
ness of alternative systems, organizations or activities." [11, p. 1] It
is apparent that comparison of alternatives is the core of cost-
effectiveness as applied to choice theory. If its techniques are applied
to a single system, caution must be exercised.
It can be seen from section I.B.I that present specifications some-
times guarantee accuracy in a restrictive sense which inhibits both the
guarantee and the evaluation to determine specification compliance. It
is also notable that most guarantees avoid the issue of costs except for
penalty values.
The cost-effectiveness approach has proven valuable in the choice of
a system from a set of alternatives and could prove valuable in guarantee-
ing a particular system. Additionally, the cost-effectiveness based
guarantee provides a stepping-stone toward controlling cost overruns.
The MOE (1/n) required in a cost-effectiveness analysis has been
presented in section II.B.
A. COSTS
1 . Types of Cost
The three types of total or life cycle costs are research and
development (R&D), investment and operating costs. To fully account for
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the "cost" of a system, these must be expressed as "economic costs" or
benefits lost due to the use of the resources required to develop, procure
and operate a particular system. Thus, these costs include hardware,
manpower, new facilities, supplies, dollar, etc.; everything directly
related to the decision to achieve the system [12, p. 25,66-67].
Care must be taken when costing an A/G delivery system that is
to be installed in an airframe so that the costs do not include those that
are incurred by the airframe independent of the A/G system [13, p. 5].
Also the concept of sunk costs [12, p. 33] must be considered if some of
the components of the system are currently developed or procured. These
costs should not be included.
Another cost that is sometimes erroneously included in computing
system costs is the attrition of systems due to combat or operational type
losses. Once the system is developed and procured, the only pertinent
cost is the operating cost.
The cost of the weapons expended to achieve the MOE are not
included due to their negligible effect compared to the other costs. The
MOE qualitatively reflects the increased weapons cost of an inefficient
system.
The methods of measuring the costs are well detailed by Fisher
[12] and many other authors and need not be repeated here. However, the
total cost concept has serious connotations in regard to a guarantee that
will be fair for many different systems and needs to be further discussed.
2. Total Cost
Total costs represent the total resource impact or full economic
cost of the system. Necessarily, the magnitude of these costs is highly
dependent on the number of systems purchased and the operating lifetime
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of the system. (The buy size and lifetime are normally estimated during
the conceptual phase of a system and the determination of these values is
not essential to this thesis.) If these total costs are used to determine
a cost-effectiveness guarantee, systems with a large buy and/or a long
lifetime will be unfairly penalized by the requirement for a higher
effectiveness level than a similar (in performance) system of which only
a few are purchased and have a shorter lifetime. The logical conclusion
is that some form of normalization is in order.
Varying opinions exist as to whether or not costs should be
normalized [6, p. 40 and 11, p. 29]. In general, normalization tends to
hide what the total cost is and in the usual context of cost-effectiveness
analysis it is important to be fully aware of the total cost. However, in
the proposed context, the lack of normalization creates the inequity shown
above, Thus, normalization is considered applicable in the guarantee
context.
3, Cost Model
Close examination of the three incremental costs shows that:
a. The R&D cost is nearly independent of the buy size and system lifetime.
Therefore, this cost can be used with no normalization.
b. The investment cost is most dependent on the buy size and it seems
natural to normalize it over the number of systems resulting in units of
dollars per system.
c. The operating cost is dependent on both lifetime and buy size.
Normalizing over both yields units of dollars per unit of time per system.
This will be expressed as an annual operating cost per system in this thesis
Now, there are three different costs with three different dimen-
2 4
sions. The cost-effectiveness model has been transformed from E to E
(where E is Euclidean n-dimensional space).
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The normalization of the costs in the cost model is unique to
the guarantee context and these costs should be used with care in other
contexts.
B. COST-EFFECTIVENESS RELATIONSHIP
The various techniques that could possibly be used to determine the
functional relationship between effectiveness and cost are detailed in
many sources such as Theil [14] and Raiffa and Schlaifer [17]. Prior to




A proper, though not extensive, data base exists for determining
the functional relationship. The cost data, reliability data, and weapon
delivery accuracy data for present and past systems is historical and can
be used [15, p. 11-13].
The data available needs to be transformed into a form compatible
with the cost-effectiveness framework outlined above. The availability,
dependability (based on a standard mission time) and capability are used
to compute 1/n. The cost data needs to be partitioned in the appropriate
accounts; i.e., R&D, investment per system, and annual operating per
system. Other adjustments to the data may be necessary. Examples of
these are well detailed in a RAND report [15, p. 17-32].
2. Technological Dynamics
With the data transformed into the proper framework, two other
aspects requiring attention still exist. First, is the fact that the
technology under which each of the systems was produced may not be the
same. The natural assumption is that the technology is increasing
chronologically and that later systems are more effective. Increased
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technology has historically carried an increased price tag. This is
partially what the cost-effectiveness curve is representing. However,
the possibility of cost decreasing, technological break-throughs is real.
If during the determination of the functional relationship, one or more
data points appear not to fit the others then these must be studied
carefully to see if such a break-through did exist. When this is the
case, a new cost-effectiveness frontier should be generated based on the
new technology. Generally, omitting the data points representative of
the old technology will be sufficient. It may be though, that there are
too few data points from the new technology. In this case, the shape of
the frontier could be determined using the old technology and the
4
"height" (in an E sense) from the new technology.
3. Inflation
The second aspect is that the dollar used to cost a particular
system is not the same dollar used to cost chronologically future or prior
systems. This is not serious though as well developed techniques exist
[15, p. 23-32] to account for the time dependent value of the dollar. All
that needs to be done is to select a date for the base value of the dollar
and transform all dollar values to this base date. It may be desirable
to change the base date periodically to keep it fairly close to the
present.
4. Functional Relationship Model
The statistical technique used to determine the functional
relationship between cost and effectiveness needs to include the ability
to explicitly state the uncertainty incurred in the predicted form. A
Bayesian regression technique might be reasonable, due to the ability to
make probability statements concerning the estimated parameters but no
extensive study of this has been conducted by the author.
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The successful completion of the above steps will result in
4
the depiction (mathematically) of a hypersurface in E that represents
a cost-effectiveness frontier.
5. Uncertainty Considerations
When estimating a hypersurface of unknown form from a few data
points, there is a high degree of uncertainty. Though it would be
appealing to use the generated hypersurface for the guarantee, it might
be unfair. Thus, the prediction uncertainty is required. The direction
of the prediction error is also uncertain and in fairness the applicable
lower bound of the prediction error interval should be used.
C. GUARANTEE
4
The cost-effectiveness guarantee is in E and cannot be depicted
graphically. However, an interpretation of the concept can be portrayed
using a representative cost axis as shown in Figure 8.
Adding a minimum effectiveness and maximum cost to the guarantee
defines the areas as shown in Figure 8 including the feasible region.
The minimum effectiveness requirement is straight forward but the maximum
cost has hidden implications. In order to guarantee a maximum total cost,
that total cost must be apportioned among the modified incremental costs.
Thus, though specifying a maximum total cost is preferable, it may be
difficult. The alternative is to specify maximum incremental costs
where the sum is not the desired maximum total cost.
The guarantee also must specify the mission time from takeoff to
on target and the r value. If these values are altered, the entire cost-
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The historical method of assessing penalties is to assign a dollar
penalty for each incremental unit outside the guaranteed value. In theory
this penalty assessment seems acceptable but in practice it often happens
that the penalty costs, when assessed, are charged back to the procuring
agency disguised as increased overhead, ground support equipment or other
type costs adding to the total system cost. The theory of a cost-
effectiveness guarantee would eliminate this practice but the method of
penalty assessment could also eliminate it. The manufacturer could be
required to meet the guarantee by reducing cost or increasing effectiveness
2. Guarantee Currency
A periodic review of the guarantee would be necessary to keep it
current. A logical mechanism for ensuring that the review is accomplished
would be to require a regeneration of the cost-effectiveness hypersurface
each time new actual data becomes available and require a constructive
review each time the guarantee is used. The minimum effectiveness and
maximum cost portion of the guarantee could be unique to each system and
these parameters could be defined during the latter type review.
3. Guarantee Parameters
The parameters for the cost-effectiveness guarantee are summarized
as
a. Minimum effectiveness
b. Maximum cost of
1) R&D
2) investment per system





e. Mission time from launch to target
f. r value
e





DERIVATION OF THE ACCURACY ESTIMATORS
The detailed derivation of the accuracy estimators, based on Bayesian
techniques, is presented below.
A. LOSS FUNCTION
The concept of a Bayesian estimator is minimization of the expected
loss; thus, a loss function is needed.
A loss function is a function that assigns a number (called the loss)
to each combination of decision and state of nature [8, p. 122]. In the
problem at hand, the state of nature is the theoretic number of targets
destroyed per sortie (1/n). The decision is the estimate of 1/n, symbol-
ized as 1/n. Any nonnegative function of the error (1/n - 1/n) can be
used as a loss function for estimation [8, p. 226]. The most commonly
used are absolute value of the difference and squared error (quadratic).
DeGroot shows [8, p. 227-228] that the quadratic loss is an acceptable
approximation for a wide range of nonnegative loss functions. Principally
because of this, the quadratic loss was chosen. An implicit assumption
involved in this choice is that the disutility of an overestimate is
identical to that of an underestimate.
The loss function is
* 2(A.l) L = a (1/n - 1/n) where a is some nonnegative constant.
Recalling equation (15) (from section II. C) with % = 1 , the loss can be
expressed as:




Letting the decision be D = In(l-p) and the state of nature be
e = ln(l-p), L = K(D-e) 2 where K = a/ln 2 (l-a). DeGroot shows [8, p. 228]
4
that, for this loss function, the Bayes decision against any given distri-
bution of e is:
(A. 3) D* = E[e]
B, SAMPLING DISTRIBUTION
One of the attributes listed in section I.D was that the methodology
be distribution free. The use of a multinomial distribution to depict

















where Z x. = N
i=l
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permits the cumulative distribution curve to take nearly any shape from
convex to concave and many conbinations thereof.
Due to the desirable independence from run-tn heading shown in section
II. E, the radial miss distance was chosen as the variable for the density.
nomi
Figure A.l relates the geometry of the impact pattern to the multi-
al density. The p. are the probability of an impact in the i
1L
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The length of the intervals (w) can be assigned as desirable. They
need not be of uniform length, though it is assumed here that all but
the k will be. The k interval will include the portion of the real
line beyond the end of the (k-1 ) interval. It would seem logical to
choose an interval length that is some function of the measurement
accuracy of the data collection method. A reasonable choice seems to be
an interval length equal to twice the measurement error in the data
collection. The data analyzed for this thesis was collected with a
measurement error of ±5 feet leading to w = 10 feet.
Another consideration is the number of intervals (k). The choice of
k should be based on the number of data points available for analysis,
the interval length and the maximal miss distance of interest. The observed
distribution of impacts may also influence the choices of k and w. In
general, a study of the system, observed data, and data collection method
should enable one to assign reasonable values to k and w.
C. CONJUGATE FAMILY
The use of a conjugate family in Bayesian analysis simplifies the
mathematical manipulation and ensures an estimate based on a sufficient
statistic [8, p. 159].
The conjugate family for the multinomial is the multivariate Beta
or Dirichlet distribution [8, p. 174], The functional form of the
Dirichlet density is:
r(a,+ ... + a. ) , i i
(A.5) fCpr ...,P k |ar ...,a k ) =




where z p. = 1
1=1
1
p.j > t=l k
a. > 1 s l,..,,k
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The expected value and variance are:
a. k







DeGroot shows [8, p. 174] that if the prior parameters are a, ,...,<*.
and x,,...,x. are the number of observations in each interval, then the
posterior parameters are a,+x, ,. . . ,a. +x. .
D. ESTIMATORS
It was stated in paragraph A (Loss Function) that the Bayes estimator,
D*, was equal to the expected value of 6 = In(l-p). There is an obvious
difference between the distribution of e and the posterior distribution
of the vector of p-'s. One assumption and one approximation are used to
derive the Bayes estimators for the p-'s.
The assumption involves the relation p = A DC. C is the probability
of an impact within r of the target given some state of the system.
Thus, C is related to the posterior of the p.'s by:
m
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..i m












The approximation involves the relation e = ln(l-p). For reasonable
values of r , the values of p are relatively small (less than .2). For
such values of p, ln(l-p) can be approximated by p with a maximum error
of approximately 15 percent.
The approximation p = In(l-p) permits setting D* = E[e] = E[p] = E[C]
Thus, the Bayes estimators for the p. are:
a. + x.





m a. + x.





For the subject problem several schemes for assigning the prior
parameters were possible. The prime factor dictating the choice was to
require a minimal number of parameter values to be assigned.
One of the most widely used and well known accuracy parameters is the
CEP. The CEP is also one of the easiest parameters to assign a priori.
The assignment can be based on system simulation, system design or some
other method tempered by experience. The procedure for using CEP as a
single assignment parameter, as discussed below, is Ad Hoc. Several
assumptions are made, the justification of which is made in section III.B,
In terms of the p.'s, the CEP is defined as:
J
.5 = E p. where j = CEP/w.
1-1
1





.5/j ; i = l,...,j
and from equation (A. 6), the a. are equal for i = l,...,j. Allowing the
k interval to be the remainder of the distribution, E[p
k
] = .5.
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.5 (jet. + ak )
These equations are solved to find
a. = ja. i=l,...,j as might have been expected.
Attempting to use the derived values and assigning values to the
variances (equation (A. 7)) leads to an inconsistent system of equations.
This can be resolved by assuming that each p. is distributed symmetrically
about its expected value. Then the variance of the p. for i=l,...,j can
be set such that 95 percent of the probable p. will be nonnegative. It
follows that:
V[ Pi ] = (E[ Pi ]/1.64)
2
For i=l ,...,j;




Solving for the a. yields;





= jc^. = 2.69J ~ .845
It has been shown, with several assumptions, that the prior parameters




SAMPLE DERIVATION OF p.
The procedures for using the Bayesian technique suggested in this
thesis are illustrated by a simple, fictitious example involving a sample
of 10 impacts. Suppose the observed radial miss distances (in feet) for
dive maneuvers in the prime mode are:
7, 92, 56, 37, 23, 6, 88, 75, 29, 41
An interval length of 10 feet and prior CEP of 50 feet will be used.



















1 0-10 2.52 2 4.52 .13
2 10-20 2.52 2.52 .07
3 20-30 2.52 2 4.52 .13
4 30-40 2.52 1 3.52 .10
5 40-50 2.52 1 3.52 .10
6 50-°° 12.61 4 16.61 .47
* x. is the number of impacts observed in the i interval
a,. + x. 6
**




EXAMPLE DERIVATION OF p
The equation p = A DC given in the WSEIAC report [7] is explained
by the following fictitious example using the C vector component as
derived in Appendix B.
Consider a system which has a prime mode and one degraded mode. The
possible system states are defined as;
A - prime mode
B - degraded mode
C - inoperative
Suppose the availabilities (probability that the system is in some







Assume the system cannot be repaired in flight. The dependabilities
(probability that the system is in some state at a specified time after
takeoff given the system state at the beginning of the mission) are
assumed to be:










Given state C at the beginning of the mission;
P{A} = P{B} =
P{C} = 1
Thus, D = 1/2 1/4 1/4
3/4 1/4
1
and AD = (1/4,5/16,7/16)
The A D is constant for a constant mission time and in most systems
will probably remain fairly constant over various mission times. There-
fore, in the weaponeering usage this could be accepted as a set of values
unique to each A/G delivery system. Then, only the final calculation
(shown next) need be performed for various r values.
The capabilities (probability that weapon impacts within r of the
target given the system state at the time of release) are as derived in
Appendix B using r = 30 feet :
3 „








The P(hit|B} is assumed to be 1/6. The value for the degraded mode
was not computed in Appendix B.
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Solving for p = A DC




Therefore, the estimated probability of placing a weapon within 30 feet





The weaponeering usage of the proposed measurement and methodology
will be illustrated using the fictitious p calculated in Appendices B
and C.









A graph similar to that shown in Figure D.l could be used, vice
solving the above equation, to find n. Entering the graph with p (called
the cumulative percentage) and a, the n could be found.
In general usage, the weaponeering requirements would be:
1) Capability tables for the applicable system and degradation modes.
2) A D vector for the applicable system.
3) Graph similar to Figure D.l.
If the A D were negligibly dependent on mission time, requirements 1 and
2 could be combined into a single table of p values for the various values
of r .
e
At the ship or airwing level, the weaponeer could use the individual
squadron capability tables or an airwing table aggregated over particular
systems in the airwing. (i.e., A-7 capability, F-4 capability, A-6
capability). In mixed strikes, the ship level weaponeer could use a
ratio weighting factor for the p based on the scheduled mix. As an
example consider a strike consisting of 8 A-7, 4 A-6 and 8 F-4. The p
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